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A Right Without a Rights-Holder Is Hollow: Introduction to OHLJ’s Special Issue
on Identifying Rights-Bearing Aboriginal Peoples
Abstract
The focus of this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal is on identifying holders of rights which
are recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. While Canadian and provincial
governments and industry proponents have assumed that Indian Act bands are section 35 rights-holders,
Kent McNeil’s analysis of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that this issue is to be resolved with reference
to Aboriginal peoples’ own laws. As such, the assumption that a section 35 rights-holder must possess an
overarching governance structure is unwarranted if the relevant Aboriginal people’s own laws are not
grounded in positivism. Naiomi Metallic’s incisive critique demonstrates that the reasoning in R v Bernard
was captured by precisely this type of positivist assumption when the court held that smaller Mìgmaq
collectives—as opposed to the larger Mìgmaq nation—must be the rights-holder because the larger
Mìgmaq nation lacked a ‘Super Chief’. Gordon Christie identifies another form of capture within the
section 35 jurisprudence: Aboriginal peoples are presumed to be socio-cultural bodies and not political
bodies, and Aboriginal rights are presumed to be cultural activities and not governmental powers to
exercise jurisdictional authority. Both presumptions are captured by liberalism and neither is supported by
the text or by a purposive interpretation of section 35(1). Sara Mainville’s article uncovers a conflict
between Canadian and Indigenous law in the context of a Kelly order, which courts characterize as a
practical solution to the dilemma of how to identify the rights-holder on an interlocutory motion. Mainville
demonstrates that the adversarial effects of a Kelly order contravene the Anishinaabe legal principle of
consensus-building. Perhaps unsurprisingly given these various conflicts between Canadian
jurisprudence and Indigenous laws, Paul Chartrand argues that the identity of rights-holders should be
decided through political negotiations between political actors, and not by the courts. Similarly, Jason
Madden argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence entails a duty on Canadian and
provincial governments to negotiate with an Aboriginal people to identify the proper rights-holder when a
prima facie Aboriginal right exists. In these ways, the articles in this special issue make valuable
contributions to ongoing discussions about identifying section 35 rights-holders.
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A Right Without a Rights-Holder Is
Hollow: Introduction to OHLJ’s Special
Issue on Identifying Rights-Bearing
Aboriginal Peoples
KAREN DRAKE*
The focus of this special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal is on identifying holders of
rights which are recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. While
Canadian and provincial governments and industry proponents have assumed that Indian
Act bands are section 35 rights-holders, Kent McNeil’s analysis of the relevant jurisprudence
reveals that this issue is to be resolved with reference to Aboriginal peoples’ own laws.
As such, the assumption that a section 35 rights-holder must possess an overarching
governance structure is unwarranted if the relevant Aboriginal people’s own laws are not
grounded in positivism. Naiomi Metallic’s incisive critique demonstrates that the reasoning
in R v Bernard was captured by precisely this type of positivist assumption when the court
held that smaller Mìgmaq collectives—as opposed to the larger Mìgmaq nation—must be
the rights-holder because the larger Mìgmaq nation lacked a ‘Super Chief’. Gordon Christie
identifies another form of capture within the section 35 jurisprudence: Aboriginal peoples
are presumed to be socio-cultural bodies and not political bodies, and Aboriginal rights are
presumed to be cultural activities and not governmental powers to exercise jurisdictional
authority. Both presumptions are captured by liberalism and neither is supported by the
text or by a purposive interpretation of section 35(1). Sara Mainville’s article uncovers a
conflict between Canadian and Indigenous law in the context of a Kelly order, which courts
characterize as a practical solution to the dilemma of how to identify the rights-holder on
an interlocutory motion. Mainville demonstrates that the adversarial effects of a Kelly order
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contravene the Anishinaabe legal principle of consensus-building. Perhaps unsurprisingly
given these various conflicts between Canadian jurisprudence and Indigenous laws, Paul
Chartrand argues that the identity of rights-holders should be decided through political
negotiations between political actors, and not by the courts. Similarly, Jason Madden argues
that the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence entails a duty on Canadian and provincial
governments to negotiate with an Aboriginal people to identify the proper rights-holder when
a prima facie Aboriginal right exists. In these ways, the articles in this special issue make
valuable contributions to ongoing discussions about identifying section 35 rights-holders.
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I. WHO ARE “THE ABORIGINAL PEOPLES OF CANADA”?
SECTION 35(1) OF THE Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and afrms the

“existing [A]boriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada.”1
Te overarching question guiding this special issue is: Who are “the [A]boriginal
peoples of Canada”?2 Answering this question at a high level of generality
is straightforward: Section 35(2) clarifes that the “‘[A]boriginal peoples of
Canada’ includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.”3 Given that
both provisions refer to “peoples” in the plural, it is unsurprising that the Supreme
Court of Canada (“SCC”) consistently afrms the collective nature of section
1.
2.
3.

Constitution Act, 1982, s 35(1), being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].
I generally use the term “Indigenous” except when “Aboriginal” is more accurate, such as
when referring to rights and rights-holders pursuant to section 35.
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1.
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35(1) rights.4 Generally speaking, the rights-holder is the relevant Aboriginal
people, or in other words, the collective. Granted, the Court has left open the
possibility that section 35(1) rights might have not only a collective but also an
individual aspect, for example, insofar as an Aboriginal individual may have an
entitlement to exercise an Aboriginal or treaty right.5 Tat being said, our focus
in this issue is on delineating the relevant rights-holding collective.
Once we take up the more specifc task of identifying particular Aboriginal
peoples, our project becomes more complex. As John Borrows explains, Indigenous
peoples’ identities have been “fractured and reconfgured” by Canadian law and
policy,6 most notably, for example, by the imposition of foreign governance
structures—such as Indian Act bands, Inuit hamlets, and Métis settlements—
over Indigenous peoples’ own forms of governance.7 However, this imposition
“has been partial and incomplete. Older Indigenous identities intermingle
with imposed, invented or reformulated identities.”8 As a result, the competing
governance orders giving rise to an Indigenous people’s identity may be difuse,
centralized, contested and ambiguous.9 Tus, processes of colonialism are at least
partly responsible for the complexity of Indigenous peoples’ identities. An equally
important consideration is the sophistication and nuance of Indigenous
peoples’ own laws and governance. Te political and governance systems of
many Indigenous peoples are fuid and/or multi-leveled. As such, the manner
of identifying the proper rights-holder can difer between diferent Indigenous
peoples. Even within a single Indigenous people, the identity of the rights-holder
can vary according to context and shift over time.
If an Indigenous people’s legal and governance processes are assumed
to be simplistic and one-dimensional, then complexity is encountered as
4.

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26 at paras 30, 33 [Behn]; R v Sappier; R v Gray,
2006 SCC 54 at paras 26, 31; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at paras 17, 37 [Marshall];
R v Sundown, [1999] 1 SCR 393 at para 36; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR
1010 at para 115 [Delgamuukw]; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1078, 1112 [Sparrow].
Behn, supra note 4 at paras 33, 35.
John Borrows, “Wise Practices in Indigenous Economic Development and Environmental
Protection” in Robert Hamilton et al, eds, Wise Practices: Exploring Indigenous Economic
Justice and Self-Determination (University of Toronto Press) [forthcoming in 2021],
manuscript at 10 [Borrows, “Wise Practices”].
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also Gordon Christie, “Potential Aboriginal Rights-holders: Canada and Cultural
Communities versus Indigenous Peoples and Socio-political Bodies” (2020) 57 Osgoode
Hall LJ 1 at 6 (describing the complexity amongst First Nations, bands, tribal councils, and
Indigenous nations).
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an unwarranted obstacle instead of as the norm, which is how complexity is
experienced within Canadian governance generally.10 Borrows highlights the
intricacy of Canada’s governance system insofar as various political collectives are
organized along at least three diferent scales: municipal, provincial/territorial,
and federal.11 Not surprisingly then, the identity of the Crown—the duty-holder
who corresponds to a section 35(1) rights-holder—is also often contested.12
Moreover, no one expects consensus or unanimity either across or within any
of Canada’s three scales of representation. Municipal, provincial/territorial, and
federal governments routinely disagree with one another, as do various political
parties, councilors, and other representatives within each level of government.
Indigenous peoples should not be held to a higher standard of consensus, and
certainly not to an impossible standard.13
Tat said, internal calls for consensus grounded in an Indigenous people’s
own laws are valuable in that they help to parse the layers of complexity and thus
to facilitate the process of identifying an Aboriginal people. For example, Sara
Mainville’s contribution to this issue discusses the processes adopted by Grand
Council Treaty Tree for ensuring the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary
Waters is “of one mind” in its decision making, as well as the ways in which these
processes are grounded in miinigoziiwin, the inherent authority given by the
Creator to the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.14 At the same time,
we must guard against a pan-Indigenous approach, which erroneously assumes all
Indigenous peoples are a homogenous monolith. Not all Indigenous peoples use
consensus-based decision making. Tus, some external critiques of an Aboriginal
people’s lack of unanimity may be grounded not in Indigenous peoples’ own
laws but in proponents’ own desires for certainty in determining with whom to

10. See Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2nd ed
(Otago University Press, 2012) at 77.
11. Borrows, “Wise Practices,” supra note 6 at 11.
12. See e.g. Shin Imai & Ashley Stacey, “Municipalities and the Duty to Consult Aboriginal
Peoples: A Case Comment on Neskonlith Indian Band v Salmon Arm (City)” (2014) 47 UBC
L Rev 293; Tomas McMorrow, “Upholding the Honour of the Crown” (2018) 35 Windsor
YB Access Just 311.
13. Similarly, as Naiomi Metallic notes in her article in this issue, the Supreme Court of Canada
“has signalled on several occasions that reconciliation means avoiding approaches that would
entail impossible evidentiary burdens.” Naiomi Metallic, “Searching for ‘Superchief ’ and
Other Fictional Indians: A Narrative and Case Comment on R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48”
(2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 230 at 247.
14. Sara Mainville, “Hunting Down a Lasting Relationship with Canada – Will UNDRIP
Help?” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 98 at 113-114, 122.
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consult.15 We can consider whether such approaches apply stereotypes and erase
the complexity of Indigenous laws and governance.
As Kent McNeil recognizes in his contribution to this issue, other than
sections 35(1) and 35(2), the current provisions of the Constitution Act, 1982
provide no further guidance on defning the section 35(1) rights-holder and
so it has fallen to either the courts or the parties to craft a resolution through
negotiations.16 Paul Chartrand, in this issue, reminds us that negotiation was
initially the favoured approach.17 Sections 37 and 37.1 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 provided for constitutional conferences on the “identifcation and
defnition” of section 35 rights with representatives of Aboriginal peoples and
federal, provincial, and territorial leaders.18 Tese conferences resulted in little
agreement, and as Chartrand reports based on his participation in the conferences,
the question of identifying section 35 rights-holders was generally ignored.19
Of course, the parties can still resolve this issue through negotiations.
Jason Madden’s contribution to this special issue argues that the SCC’s section
35 jurisprudence entails a Crown duty to negotiate with an Indigenous
people about how to identify the rights-holder.20 Tis approach is consistent
with reconciliation, the central purpose and “frst principle”21 of section 35,
as consistently afrmed by the SCC.22 Given the Court’s notoriously nebulous
reconciliation jurisprudence, commentary abounds on what this term does or

15. See e.g. Aidan Macnab, “Indigenous Law Experts Weigh in on the Wet’Suwet’en Protests,”
Canadian Lawyer (25 February 2020), online: <www.canadianlawyermag.com/practice-areas/
indigenous/indigenous-law-experts-weigh-in-on-the-wetsuweten-protests/326702> [perma.
cc/854C-2E2G] (particularly Roy Millen’s comments).
16. Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights and Indigenous Governance: Identifying the Holders of
Rights and Authority” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 127 at 128.
17. Paul Chartrand, “Rethinking the Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights: Te Métis Cases” (2020) 57
Osgoode Hall LJ 173 at 174.
18. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1, ss 37, 37.1.
19. Chartrand, supra note 17 at 174, n 4.
20. Jason Madden, “Te Re-Emergence of One of the Previously Slayed Métis Rights-Denial
Dragons: A Comment on the Dangers and Duplicity in Fort Chipewyan Métis Nation of
Alberta Local #125 v. Alberta,” (2020) 57 Osgoode Hall LJ 195 at 200-201.
21. Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Governor General in Council), 2018 SCC 40 at para 22,
Karakatsanis J.
22. Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 56 at para 12; Mikisew Cree First
Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69 at para 1; R v Van der Peet,
[1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31 [Van der Peet].
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should mean.23 Whatever else “reconciliation” might mean, it arguably calls
for a non-adversarial relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Crown.
For example, the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia explains that
the “governing ethos” of section 35 “is not one of competing interests but of
reconciliation.”24 Te inherently adversarial nature of our justice system means
only a negotiated—rather than court-imposed—solution is consistent with
reconciliation.25
Mainville highlights the potential promise of the federal government’s recent
litigation directive as a means of avoiding the pitfalls of litigating the issue of
identifying section 35 rights-holders.26 Litigation Guideline #15 of the document
directs the federal government to take a “large and liberal approach … to the
question of who is the proper rights holder” and seems to recognize the value of
a non-litigious approach: “Canada respects the right of Indigenous peoples and
nations to defne themselves and counsel’s pleadings and other submissions must
respect the proper rights-bearing collective.”27 And yet, litigation on the issue of
identifying the rights-holder continues. Te SCC has granted leave to appeal
in R v Desautel.28 Mr. Desautel is a member of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville
Confederated Tribes, which forms a part of the Sinixt people.29 Sinixt traditional
territory spans the Canada–US border, extending north into British Columbia

23. For discussions of the meaning of “reconciliation,” see Aimée Craft, “Neither Infringement
nor Justifcation: Te Supreme Court of Canada’s Mistaken Approach to Reconciliation”
in Karen Drake & Brenda L Gunn, eds, Renewing Relationships: Indigenous Peoples and
Canada (Wiyasiwewin Mikiwahp Native Law Centre, 2019) 59; Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of Canada, Canada’s Residential Schools: Reconciliation: Te Final Report of
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, vol 6 (McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2015) [TRC Final Report]; Mark D Walters, “Te Jurisprudence of Reconciliation:
Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, eds, Te Politics of
Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford University Press, 2008) 165.
24. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 17 [Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC].
25. Felix Hoehn, “Te Duty to Negotiate and the Ethos of Reconciliation” (2020) 83
Sask L Rev 1 at 2.
26. Mainville, supra note 14 at 106.
27. Canada, Department of Justice, Te Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil
Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada,
2018), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/litigation-litiges.html>
[perma.cc/P848-WPH5].
28. R v Desautel, 2019 BCCA 151 [Desautel CA], leave to appeal to SCC granted, 38734 (24
October 2019) [Desautel Leave to SCC Granted]. Although the federal government is
not a party in this case, it is an intervenor. Tis case is discussed by Kent McNeil in his
contribution to this special issue. See supra note 16 at 163-167.
29. Desautel CA, supra note 28 at paras 4, 49.
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and south into Washington State.30 Mr. Desautel is neither a resident nor a
citizen of Canada; he lives on the Colville Indian Reserve in Washington State.31
While hunting in the portion of Sinixt territory located in British Columbia,
he shot an elk and was charged with hunting without a licence and without
being a resident of British Columbia, in violation of British Columbia’s Wildlife
Act.32 Mr. Desautel argues his actions were protected by section 35(1). Tis case
raises the issue of whether an Indigenous people who are no longer resident in
Canada, and whose members are not Canadian citizens, can have section 35
Aboriginal rights.
Te articles in this special issue provide guidance on all of these topics. Part
II of this introduction, below, examines the current law on identifying a section
35 rights-holder. It summarizes Kent McNeil’s contribution, which synthesizes
the existing jurisprudence and concludes that the rights-holder is to be identifed
in accordance with an Indigenous people’s own law. Tis section also analyzes
the text of section 35 which indicates rights-holders are political entities with
governmental powers such as jurisdiction and law-making authority. In contrast,
as Gordon Christie’s article illustrates, the SCC’s jurisprudence conceptualizes
section 35 rights-holders as mere socio-cultural bodies, in accordance with the
commitments of liberalism. In other words, the Court’s jurisprudence succumbs
to constitutional capture. Aaron Mills explains constitutional capture as the
violence that results when one legal order is understood not through the lens of
its own lifeworld and constitutionalism, but rather is translated through the logic
of a diferent constitutionalism.33 Te Court’s jurisprudence flters Aboriginal
rights through the lens of liberal constitutionalism. Part III discusses Naiomi
Metallic’s article, which uncovers the errors within the courts’ analyses in R v
Bernard. Most signifcantly, Metallic shows that the lower courts misstate the
SCC’s Aboriginal rights test by inventing a community-occupation-continuity
requirement. Given the concerns highlighted by Metallic, this newly invented
requirement should not be adopted in Desautel. Te analysis of the courts in R
v Bernard is also captured by legal positivism. Next, Part IV examines potential
challenges when identifying a rights-holder in accordance with Indigenous law.
Sara Mainville’s article illustrates the challenge that arises when a court and
Crown litigants refuse to defer to Indigenous law. Te result is an unnecessarily
30.
31.
32.
33.

R v Desautel, 2017 BCPC 84 at paras 20-21.
Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 4.
Ibid at para 5.
Aaron James Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin: All Tat Has Been Given
for Living Well Together: One Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism (PhD Dissertation,
University of Victoria, 2019) [unpublished] at 14, 24.
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adversarial approach which obstructs reconciliation. Part V considers who should
determine the identity of the rights-holder. Many contributors highlight the folly
of judicializing this issue. Paul Chartrand advocates for an approach based on
consent and negotiations between Indigenous peoples and the executive branch
of the Canadian government. According to Jason Madden, the SCC’s section
35 jurisprudence supports this approach; and yet, as Madden illustrates, the
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench has failed to uphold this jurisprudence. Finally,
the conclusion considers the need for mandatory education on Indigenous and
Aboriginal legal issues within law school curricula, given the concerns raised by
the contributions to this special issue. Although Adrien Habermacher’s article
was not part of the workshop that led to this special issue, it makes a valuable
contribution to this discussion insofar as it reveals the rationales underlying some
faculty members’ resistance to including Indigenous and Aboriginal legal issues
within law school curricula.

II. HOW TO IDENTIFY THE RIGHTS-HOLDER
Although the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly addressed the topic,
lower courts have been contending with whether a larger Indigenous nation or
smaller sub-entities within that nation are the rights-holders. As Gordon Christie
explains, framing the question in this way as merely one of community scale can
be superfcial.34 In some cases, the smaller entities at issue—such as family groups,
clans, houses, and so on—are aspects of the Indigenous peoples’ own political
system.35 In other cases, smaller entities—such as the Indian Act bands, Inuit
hamlets, and Métis settlements discussed above—are state-imposed attempts to
dismember and replace Indigenous political bodies.36 Part II(A), below, critically
examines the common assumption that Indian Act bands are rights-holders. Part
II(B) outlines Kent McNeil’s synthesis of the jurisprudence, which establishes that
the identity of the rights-holder is determined in accordance with an Indigenous
people’s own laws about its collective identity. Te third sub-section, Part II(C),
examines the text of section 35, which identifes rights-holders as “peoples,”
a term commonly understood to denote political entities who are entitled to
exercise governmental authority such as jurisdiction. Te plain meaning of the
text contrasts sharply with the SCC’s jurisprudence which implicitly characterizes
Aboriginal peoples as mere socio-cultural entities, as Christie reveals. Part II(D)
undertakes a purposive analysis of section 35. It concludes that the purpose of
34. Christie, supra note 9 at 9-11.
35. Ibid at 9.
36. Ibid at 9.
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section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal peoples with Canada’s de facto control of
Aboriginal peoples’ lands. Tis analysis is consistent with the plain text, according
to which section 35 rights-holders are “peoples.”
A. IS THE INDIAN ACT BAND THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDER?

Industry proponents, media outlets, members of the public, and even government
representatives often assume state-imposed entities such as Indian Act bands
are the proper rights-holders.37 For example, government representatives and
industry proponents often attempt to consult with band councils in order to
fulfll their duty to consult and accommodate prior to carrying out projects that
impact section 35 rights.38 Tis issue recently entered public consciousness with
Coastal GasLink’s plan to put a pipeline through the territory of the Wet’suwet’en
nation. Band councils of the Wet’suwet’en nation signed agreements with Coastal
GasLink, while the hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en nation opposed the
project.39 Some commentary on traditional and social media assumed the band
councils—and not the Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs—represented the proper
rights-holders, and thus proponents and government representatives were only
obligated to consult and accommodate band councils.40 Commentators also
assumed the band councils consented to the project given their agreements
with Coastal GasLink, and thus Coastal GasLink’s consultation must have been
sufcient.41 Are any of these assumptions correct?
Before focusing on the question of identifying the rights-holder, we can
examine the fnal assumption listed above, namely, that entering into an agreement
with an industry proponent demonstrates the consent of the Indigenous signatory.
In a careful study of impact beneft agreements, Dayna Nadine Scott exposes the
faulty logic underlying this assumption.42 Tese agreements are executed in the
37. Dayna Nadine Scott, “Extraction Contracting: Te Struggle for Control of Indigenous
Lands” (2020) 119 South Atlantic Q 269 at 275.
38. Christie, supra note 9 at 3-4, 9.
39. Macnab, supra note 15.
40. See e.g. Stephen LeDrew, “Canada Should Enforce the Law with Wet’Suwet’en Anti-pipeline
Protests,” National Post (11 February 2020), online: <nationalpost.com/opinion/
stephen-ledrew-canada-should-enforce-the-law-with-wetsuweten-anti-pipeline-protests>
[perma.cc/Z8T8-KAFS]. For opposing views, see Shiri Pasternack, “No, those who defend
the Wet’suwet’en Territory are not criminals,” Te Globe and Mail (15 January 2020),
online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-no-those-who-defend-the-wetsuwetenterritory-are-not-criminals> [perma.cc/NRV6-Z4XU]; Kent McNeil, “Pipeline protests and
the rule of law,” Vancouver Sun (22 February 2020), online: <vancouversun.com/opinion/
kent-mcneil-pipeline-protests-and-the-rule-of-law> [perma.cc/B22V-M9DV].
41. See e.g. LeDrew, supra note 40.
42. Scott, supra note 37 at 273.
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shadow of the law, which in this context contains a structural power imbalance:
Current Canadian doctrinal law on asserted but not yet established rights denies
a veto to the Aboriginal rights-holder, but provides a veto to the state.43 Scott
documents the views of Indigenous leaders who do not consent to projects and
yet they enter into impact beneft agreements. Tey point to their obligation to
obtain some beneft for their community and their inability to stop the project.44
Returning to our primary topic, an Indian Act band is not necessarily the
proper rights-holder.45 Bands and band councils are creatures of statute. Band
councils are (tautologically) the proper rights-holders of the rights granted to band
councils in the Indian Act. As Christie notes in this issue, the powers delegated to
bands in the Indian Act are limited to their reserves.46 Te vast majority of resource
development projects occur outside reserve boundaries but within an Indigenous
people’s traditional territory, as is the case with Coastal GasLink’s proposal to put
a pipeline through Wet’suwet’en territory. Tese projects impact an Indigenous
people’s inherent authority with respect to their traditional territory, as opposed to
any rights created by the Indian Act. Similarly, we can imagine proposed activity
on a reserve that impacts an Indigenous people’s inherent authority without
afecting the limited rights created by the Indian Act. Tis inherent authority is
what section 35(1) protects.47 Who is the proper rights-holder of these inherent
rights? Te next part considers the existing jurisprudence, according to which
the rights-holder is determined by the Indigenous peoples’ own laws. In some
circumstances, the rights-holder can be coterminous with an Indian Act band,
for example, as Metallic explains, if a band or other sub-group identifes and
understands itself as a distinct people.48 More often, the rights-holder is a larger
nation encompassing multiple bands.
B. JURISPRUDENCE ON IDENTIFYING THE PROPER RIGHTS-HOLDER

In his contribution to this special issue, Kent McNeil provides a comprehensive
synthesis of the jurisprudence on the proper rights-holder in Aboriginal title,
43. Ibid at 277, 279.
44. Ibid at 278-79.
45. Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation v Canada (AG), 2012 BCCA 193 at para 77; Kelly
v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 1220 at para 58 [Kelly 2013], rev’d in part but af’d on this
issue 2014 ONCA 92 [Kelly CA].
46. Christie, supra note 9 at 3. See also R v Lewis, [1996] 1 SCR 921 at para 80 (holding that
“Parliament’s intention in enacting s. 81(1) as a whole [the provision detailing band councils’
governance powers] … was to provide a mechanism by which Band Councils could assume
management over certain activities within the territorial limits of their constituencies”).
47. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 40.
48. Metallic, supra note 13 at 253.
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Aboriginal right, and duty to consult and accommodate cases involving First
Nation claimants. He fnds that many SCC decisions to date have left the issue
unaddressed. Aboriginal rights have been raised typically by individuals as defences
to regulatory prosecutions, and so identifying the rights-holding collective has
been unnecessary.49 And for the most part, the authority of claimants in duty to
consult and accommodate cases decided by the SCC has not been questioned.50
McNeil illustrates that Aboriginal title cases are more illuminating, and that the
lower court decisions in Tsilhqot’in Nation in particular establish that courts are
to resolve this issue by looking to Indigenous peoples’ own laws, culture, and
traditions.51 In other words, who is the proper rights-holder according to the
Indigenous people’s own laws? As McNeil notes, this is a question of fact which
will depend on the evidence of the Indigenous people’s laws about their collective
identity; thus, the answer can difer for diferent Indigenous peoples.52
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the lower courts held the larger Tsilhqot’in Nation—
and not the smaller Indian Act bands within the Tsilhqot’in Nation—was the
proper holder of the claimed Aboriginal rights and title.53 McNeil explains that
the SCC’s declaration of Aboriginal title for the Tsilhqot’in Nation implicitly
afrms this conclusion.54 In reaching his decision, the trial judge, Justice Vickers,
applied the Powley factors—including shared customs, traditions, and collective
identity—for identifying a historic rights-bearing community.55 Te evidence
established that these factors existed at the level of the Tsilhqot’in people as a
whole, and the rights of any Tsilhqot’in individual or sub-entity are derived from
these nation-wide customs, or in other words, laws.56 For example, Tsilhqot’in
laws provided that, although one of the Tsilhqot’in bands—the Xeni Gwet’in—
was currently the caretaker of the claimed territory, any Tsilhqot’in person could
hunt or fsh anywhere within Tsilhqot’in territory, including within the claimed
territory.57 Tus, the band structure did not alter their true identity as Tsilhqot’in

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

McNeil, supra note 16 at 168.
Ibid.
Ibid at 168-69.
Ibid at 168, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 439
[Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC]. See also Ogichidaakwe v Ontario (Energy), 2014 ONSC
5492 at para 13.
McNeil, supra note 16.
Ibid.
Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 442, citing R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43 at
para 23 [Powley].
See McNeil, supra note 16 at 168, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 470.
McNeil, supra note 16 at 138, 168-69, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at
paras 459, 468.
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people and “is without any meaning in the resolution of Aboriginal title and
rights for Tsilhqot’in people.”58
Te Powley factors might be interpreted as essentially cultural markers insofar
as they do not require a political system or decision-making authority at the level
of the rights-holder.59 Tus, the lack of an overarching pan-Tsilhqot’in governance
structure was immaterial.60 Even though “Tsilhqot’in decision-making and
governance traditionally took place on a localized level” within smaller family or
encampment groupings, the Court of Appeal afrmed Justice Vickers’s conclusion
that the rights-holder is the larger Tsilhqot’in Nation.61 Both courts rejected
British Columbia’s attempt to impose a governance structure requirement.
British Columbia argued that to be a proper rights-holder, an entity must have
traditionally exercised decision-making authority about the allocation of the rights
at issue, and thus the lack of any traditional pan-Tsilhqot’in governance structure
should be fatal to the claim that the Tsilhqot’in nation was the rights-holder.62
We can critically examine the assumptions underlying this argument.
As noted above, the Tsilhqot’in nation did in fact have customs at the
national level about who could exercise hunting and fshing rights within
Tsilhqot’in territory. And yet, British Columbia seemed to urge the courts to
disregard the signifcance of these customs, merely because they did not emanate
from a “pan-Tsilhqot’in governance structure.” If these customs were not the
product of an overarching governance structure, where did they come from? One
possibility is that they are customary laws,63 which do not depend on a centralized
authority for either their existence or their enforcement. Instead, customary laws
are refected in the practices which are widely accepted within a community as
having normative force, which in turn rests on persuasive compliance.64 Te

58. McNeil, supra note 16 at 138, citing Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 469.
59. Powley, supra note 55 at para 23, cited by Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para
442 (recognizing “that diferent groups of Métis have often lacked political structures” and
afrming that a collective identity that exhibits “some degree of continuity and stability” is
sufcient for establishing a rights-bearing community).
60. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at paras 145-46
[Tsilhqot’in Nation CA].
61. Ibid at para 146.
62. Ibid at para 145.
63. I make this suggestion merely as a hypothetical and not as a description of actual Tsilhqot’in
laws. I do not have the expertise to analyze Tsilhqot’in laws and I am not making a claim
about Tsilhqot’in laws.
64. See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, 2010) at
51-52 [Borrows, Indigenous Constitution]; Mills, supra note 33 at 172.
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traditional governance systems of many Indigenous peoples—though not all65—
are grounded in customary laws.66
In contrast, the Canadian legal system is commonly thought to instantiate
legal positivism,67 which holds that all law is derived from, and enforced by,
institutions specifcally authorized to perform those tasks. According to legal
positivism, customary laws are not laws. Instead, they are some lesser aspect of
culture such as ethics, morals, or etiquette because they are neither produced nor
enforced by institutions specifcally authorized for those purposes.68 With this
explanation in mind, British Columbia’s argument in Tsilhqot’in Nation is revealed
as being steeped within positivism. It assigns no signifcance to customary laws
merely because they were not produced by the particular type of decision-making
structure endorsed by legal positivism. Justice Vickers rejects British Columbia’s
approach because it “is weighed down with superfcial value judgments,” insofar
as using the norms of one society to assess the norms of another assumes the
former is “civilized” while the latter is “without cohesion, laws or culture, in efect
a subhuman species.”69 Likewise, the Court of Appeal rejected a positivist
governance structure requirement because of the impossibility of tracing the
smaller sub-entities to modern counterparts given the fuidity of the Tsilhqot’in
political structure.70 If a static, positivist governance structure requirement is
imposed, then “no one would be able to claim Aboriginal rights on behalf of the

65. See Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 64 at ch 2, especially at 51-55 (explaining
that Indigenous peoples are often characterized as possessing only customary law, but in
fact their legal systems also encompass positivistic law, as well as sacred law, natural law, and
deliberative law).
66. I use the phrase “customary law” given its prevalence within the literature, especially
within discussions of the dichotomy between legal positivism and customary law. But
Aaron Mills argues compellingly that Indigenous “law” is better conceptualized in terms of
constitutionalism. See generally Mills, supra note 33.
67. For a naturalist analysis of the liberal positivism informing Canadian law regarding
Aboriginal rights, see Gordon Christie, Canadian Law and Indigenous Self-Determination:
A Naturalist Analysis (University of Toronto Press, 2019) at ch 6.
68. See Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 64 at 12, citing John Austin, Te Province of
Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 176; Hamar Foster, “One
Good Ting: Law, Elevator Etiquette and Litigating Aboriginal Rights in Canada” (2010) 37
Adv Q 66 (recounting the suggestion made by counsel for Canada in the Tsilhqot’in case that
Tsilhqot’in “rules were more like elevator etiquette than law” at 80-81).
69. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 453, citing Calder v British Columbia
(AG), [1973] SCR 313 at 346, Hall J, dissenting (but not on this point) [Calder]; see also
Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at paras 145-46.
70. Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at para 146.

xvi

(2020) 57 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Tsilhqot’in.”71 A right without a rights-holder is hollow.72 In other words, using
the conventions of one legal system (e.g., legal positivism) to evaluate a society that
instantiates a diferent legal system (e.g., customary law), results in constitutional
capture. For these reasons, the test for identifying a section 35 rights-holder does
not require a positivist decision-making or governance structure at the level of
the rights-holder.
Although the rights-holder can take diferent forms for diferent Indigenous
peoples, in most cases, the rights-holder is a larger nation encompassing multiple
bands as opposed to a single Indian Act band.73 Tis is hardly surprising given
that the band structure is viewed by many Indigenous peoples as an artifcial
imposition which does not correlate with their own laws and political system.74
McNeil does identify a lower court decision where the proper rights-holders are
the bands: Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (Attorney General).75 As McNeil notes,
this conclusion in this case is not inconsistent with the trial judge’s conclusion in
Tsilhqot’in Nation because both are supported by the evidence of the respective
Indigenous peoples’ laws about their collective identity.76 Te Indigenous
claimants in Ahousaht Indian Band asserted that their fve Indian Act bands were
the rights-holders, and argued only in the alternative that the fve bands formed
a single Nuu-chah-nulth Nation, although they did not press the latter argument
in fnal submissions.77 Canada did not argue that either the larger nation or the
bands were the rights-holders; it merely argued the fve bands failed to satisfy the
community continuity requirement,78 discussed in Part IV, below. Te trial judge
agreed with the Aboriginal claimants that the fve bands were the rights-holders.79
Te evidence established that each of the fve claimants self-identifed as an
autonomous nation, despite sharing a common Nuu-chah-nulth language,
71. Ibid at para 146.
72. Karen Drake, “Who Are the Métis? Te Role of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in
Identifying a Métis Rights-Holder” in Dwight Newman & Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu,
eds, Indigenous–Industry Agreements, Natural Resources, and the Law (Routledge, 2020)
[Drake, “Who are the Métis?”].
73. Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 52 at para 445. See also Metallic, supra note 13 at 253.
For a list of decisions in which the nation—as opposed to a smaller sub-entity—is assumed
or held to be the rights-holder, see R v Bernard, 2017 NBCA 48 at para 51 [Bernard CA].
74. Borrows, “Wise Practices,” supra note 6 at 10.
75. McNeil, supra note 16 at 169-70, citing Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada (AG), 2009 BCSC
1494 [Ahousaht Indian Band], rev’d in part on other grounds 2013 BCCA 300.
76. McNeil, supra note 16 at 169-70. See also Ahousaht Indian Band, supra note 75 at para 8.
77. Ahousaht Indian Band, supra note 75 at paras 1, 7-8.
78. Ibid at para 300.
79. Ibid at paras 323, 336, 344, 354, 365, 909.
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culture, and history.80 Tis case illustrates the importance of not imposing a
pan-Indigenous approach; diferent Indigenous peoples organize themselves
politically in diferent ways.
Tus, Ahousaht Indian Band afrms the principle established in Tsilhqot’in
Nation that the rights-holder is determined by the Indigenous peoples’ own laws.
In some circumstances, those laws establish the rights-holder is coterminous with
an Indian Act band; in others, the rights-holder is a larger nation encompassing
multiple bands.
C. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS-HOLDER BASED ON THE PLAIN MEANING
OF THE TEXT

None of the courts in Powley, Tsilhqot’in Nation, or Ahousaht Indian Band
analyzed the rights-holder issue in the light of the text of section 35. Tis is
puzzling, given the SCC’s preoccupation with the text of treaties while claiming
to recognize the signifcance of treaties’ oral terms.81 Presumably, when the
Court explicitly addresses the rights-holder issue, its analysis will begin with a
consideration of the words of section 35. As is well known, section 35 must
be given a purposive interpretation,82 which is discussed below. But a purposive
interpretation is not an invitation to dispense with the text of a constitutional
provision.83 Constitutional interpretation begins with the language of the
constitutional provision in question; this principle is not displaced by any other
principle of constitutional interpretation.84
Te text of both sub-sections 35(1) and 35(2) describes the rights-holders as
the “[A]boriginal peoples of Canada.”85 As Chartrand notes, the term “peoples”
is commonly understood to be synonymous with “nations.”86 Yet as Metallic
recognizes, courts—including the Supreme Court of Canada—do not confne
themselves to the terms “peoples” or “nations” when referring to Aboriginal
80. Ibid at para 299.
81. See e.g. R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at paras 39, 52, 55, 57, 101 (afrming the importance
of the oral terms of a treaty but not giving efect to those oral terms in the actual holding
of the decision).
82. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 21-22, 26-31.
83. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 53 [Succession Reference]; Caron
v Alberta, 2015 SCC 56 at para 36 [Caron].
84. Caron, supra note 83 at para 37; British Columbia (AG) v Canada (AG), [1994]
2 SCR 41 at 88.
85. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 1 [emphasis added].
86. Chartrand, supra note 17 at 178. See also Larry Chartrand, “Te Constitutional
Determination of a Métis Rights-Bearing Community: Reorienting the Powley Test” in Karen
& Brenda, supra note 23, 169 at 171 [Chartrand, “Métis Rights-Bearing Community”].
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peoples.87 In fact, the Court often defaults to the terms “communities”
or “groups,” among others, instead of “peoples.”88 Te Court never explains or
defends this equivocation, which seems unwarranted given the diferences in
meaning between “peoples” on the one hand, and “communities” or “groups”
on the other.89 Christie’s article in this issue provides a valuable framework for
understanding the signifcance of these diferences. He illustrates how the various
propositions and requirements within the Court’s jurisprudence on site-specifc
Aboriginal rights result in (1) a conception of Aboriginal peoples as socio-cultural
bodies as opposed to political bodies, and (2) a conception of Aboriginal rights
as cultural activities as opposed to governmental powers to exercise jurisdictional
authority or, in other words, engage in law-making.90 Te Court’s deeper
rationale underlying these choices goes unstated throughout its jurisprudence,
but Christie demonstrates how the philosophical tenets of liberalism provide a
comprehensive explanation. A key premise of liberalism is that each individual
is entitled to structure and live their life in accordance with their own values and
norms.91 For some individuals in a multicultural context, their preferred values
and norms can only be fully accessed through the group or community—such
as a religious community, for example—which serves as the cultural repository
of those values and norms.92 Within liberalism, these groups or communities are
socio-cultural bodies, not political bodies; as Christie explains, “the liberal state
is presumed to be the sole source of political and legal authority.”93 Within the
Court’s jurisprudence, Aboriginal peoples are akin to these socio-cultural bodies
and Aboriginal rights are akin to the rights of members of the equity-seeking
groups who make up the socio-cultural bodies. Te Court’s commitment to
liberalism leaves no conceptual space for an understanding of Aboriginal peoples

87. Metallic, supra note 13 at 250-51.
88. For a list of such decisions, see Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 51. See also Chartrand,
“Métis Rights-Bearing Community,” supra note 86 at 171.
89. Te most pronounced instance of this equivocation occurs at para 12 of Powley, where the
Court moves from a discussion of Métis “peoples” or “people” to a discussion of a Métis
“community” with no justifcation for introducing the term “community,” which appears
nowhere in the text of section 35. See Powley, supra note 55 at para 12. For critiques of this
equivocation, see Karen Drake, “Who are the Métis?,” supra note 72 at 8; Chartrand, “Métis
Rights-Bearing Community,” supra note 86 at 171-72.
90. Christie, supra note 9 at 9, 14-19.
91. Ibid at 29.
92. Ibid at 30. See also Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Teory of Minority
Rights (Clarendon Press, 1995) at ch 5.
93. Christie, supra note 9 at 30.
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as political entities,94 nor for an Aboriginal right to exercise legal or political
authority.95 Te Court’s analysis is captured by liberalism.
Te SCC’s shift from “peoples” to “groups” and “communities” coheres
seamlessly with this vision of Aboriginal rights as captured within liberalism. Te
term “peoples” is commonly understood to denote political entities as opposed
to mere socio-cultural entities, given the various international law instruments
afrming that peoples have the right of self-determination.96 In contrast, the
terms “group” and “community” typically describe equity-seeking groups who
claim state protection for their cultural choices but make no claim to be entitled
to exercise governmental powers such as jurisdiction and law-making authority.
Te problem is the complete lack of textual basis for replacing “peoples” with
“groups” or “communities.” Although principles of constitutional interpretation
provide for a large and liberal interpretation, these principles “do not undermine
the primacy of the written text of the Constitution.”97 As the SCC has recognized,
the Constitution is not “an empty vessel to be flled with whatever meaning”
the Court might choose.98 Te Constitutional text states the rights-holders are
“peoples”; the jurisprudence should respect this text.
D. A PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35

As mentioned, section 35 must be given a purposive interpretation, which
requires identifying the rationale underlying section 35 and then interpreting
it in a way that gives efect to that rationale.99 Te overarching purpose of
section 35 is reconciliation,100 but identifying the exact two things that require
94. Shin Imai & Kathryn Gunn, “Indigenous Belonging: Membership and Identity in the
UNDRIP: Articles 9, 33, 35, and 36” in Jessie Hohmann & Marc Weller, eds, Te
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Oxford University
Press, 2018) 213 at 234 (explaining that the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
identifes Indigenous peoples as “political units, not ethnic enclaves”) [Imai & Gunn,
“Indigenous Belonging”].
95. Christie, supra note 9 at 31.
96. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, art 1(2) (entered into
force 24 October 1945); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 1 (entered into force 3 January 1976); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 1 (entered
into force 23 March 1976); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted
13 September 2007) arts 1, 3 [UN Declaration].
97. Caron, supra note 83 at para 36; Secession Reference, supra note 83 at para 53.
98. Caron, supra note 83 at para 36; Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta),
[1987] 1 SCR 313 at 394.
99. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 21-22.
100. Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 31.
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reconciling is far from straightforward. Aimée Craft provides a table summarizing
the SCC’s many statements on this topic.101 On one side of the reconciliation
ledger, we have something related to Aboriginal peoples; this has been variously
described by the Court as Aboriginal “peoples,” “cultures,” “rights,” “societies,”
or “prior occupation,” among others.102 On the other side, we have something
related to Canada; this has been variously described by the Court as “the assertion
of Crown sovereignty,” “Canadian sovereignty,” “non-Aboriginal peoples,” “the
arrival of Europeans,”103 or “de facto control of land and resources that were
formerly in the control of [an Aboriginal] people,”104 among others. Te wide
variety among these descriptors could be used to support diferent articulations of
the purpose of section 35 and hence diferent interpretations of “peoples.”105 For
example, if one accepts that the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal
cultures on the one hand, with Canadian sovereignty on the other, then one would
be motivated to characterize Aboriginal peoples as mere socio-cultural groups or
communities asserting cultural rights within a sovereign state, the legitimacy of
which is unquestioned. Te justifcation for these cultural rights comes from
liberalism, in accordance with Christie’s analysis.
In contrast, if the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal peoples
with Canada’s de facto control of Aboriginal peoples’ lands, then Aboriginal
peoples can be understood as peoples or political entities who are entitled to
exercise governmental and law-making authority. Te state’s sovereignty is
de facto and not de jure,106 and thus the rationale underlying Indigenous
governmental authority is not liberalism but rather the right of self-determination,
or in other words, Indigenous peoples’ own inherent authority. In this way, the
indeterminacy of the current reconciliation jurisprudence supports multiple
purposive interpretations of the section 35 rights-holder. To decide between
these interpretations, we must evaluate the assumptions informing them. Is the
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Craft, supra note 23 at 73.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at para 32.
Chief Justice Lamer seems to touch on this point in Van der Peet. Shortly after afrming that
a purposive interpretation of section 35(1) will facilitate reconciliation, he acknowledges
that “the notion of ‘reconciliation’ does not, in the abstract, mandate a particular content for
aboriginal rights.” See Van der Peet, supra note 22 at para 50.
106. For an analysis of Canada’s sovereignty as de facto and not de jure, see Ryan Beaton, “De
facto and de jure Crown Sovereignty: Reconciliation and Legitimation at the Supreme
Court of Canada” (2018) 27 Const Forum Const 25; Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties:
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Native Law Center, University of Saskatchewan, 2012) at
34-35; Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR
(2d) 433 at 437-38.
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Canadian state’s claim of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples and Indigenous
territories legitimate (supporting the former interpretation) or illegitimate
(supporting the latter interpretation)? A multitude of reports and legal and
scholarly analyses demonstrate the illegitimacy of Canada’s claim of sovereignty
vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples.107 Moreover, the latter interpretation coheres with
the plain meaning of the text which, as discussed above, states that section 35
rights-holders are “peoples.” Te former interpretation, in contrast, directly
contradicts the plain meaning of the text. Tus, the most coherent purposive
interpretation provides that the purpose of section 35 is to reconcile Aboriginal
peoples with Canada’s de facto control of Aboriginal peoples’ lands, and thus that
section 35 rights-holders are peoples.

III. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS-HOLDER IN R V BERNARD
Te issue of identifying the rights-holder recently arose in R v Bernard. In this case,
Naiomi Metallic served as counsel at the Court of Appeal for Stephen Bernard,
a Mìgmaw member of the Sipekne’katik First Nation.108 Her contribution to
this special issue provides an incisive critical analysis of the courts’ decisions in
this case. Mr. Bernard was charged with hunting in the northern part of the
City of Saint John, New Brunswick, without a licence, contrary to provincial
legislation.109 He argued he had a section 35(1) Aboriginal right to do so.110 Te
courts rejected Mr. Bernard’s section 35(1) claim for two interrelated reasons.
First, the courts held the smaller “communities,” rather than the larger Mìgmaq
nation, were the Aboriginal rights-holders.111 Te territory in New Brunswick
where Mr. Bernard was hunting was part of the territory of the Mìgmaq nation,
but not of Mr. Bernard’s specifc band, whose reserve is located in Nova Scotia.112
107. TRC Final Report, supra note 23 at 29; Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples:
Looking Forward, Looking Back, vol 1 (Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 661; Larry
Chartrand, “Indigenous Peoples: Caught in a Perpetual Human Rights Prison” (2016) 67
UNBLJ 167 at 169; Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in
Canada (University of Toronto Press, 2014) at 11; Hoehn, supra note 106; Robert J Miller
et al, Discovering Indigenous Lands: Te Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford
University Press, 2010); John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537; Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem,
“Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 29
Alta L Rev 498.
108. Metallic, supra note 13 at 233.
109. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 9.
110. Ibid at para 36.
111. Ibid at paras 45, 50, 62.
112. Ibid at paras 4-5, 19, 41.
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Second, the courts introduced what I refer to as the community-occupationcontinuity requirement. Te courts held that Mr. Bernard failed to satisfy this
requirement because the Mìgmaq sub-entity who traditionally occupied the
territory where Mr. Bernard was hunting had left the area “a long time ago” and
there was “no evidence of a contemporary community of Mi’kmaq in the area.”113
Part III(A), below, critically examines the courts’ frst reason for rejecting Mr.
Bernard’s claim. Part III(B) examines the second reason.
A. IS THE RIGHTS-HOLDER THE SMALLER OR THE LARGER ENTITY?

As Metallic explains, the courts accepted the Crown’s argument that the larger
Mìgmaq nation could not be the proper rights-holder because it lacked an
overarching decision-making authority, given its historically decentralized
nature.114 Tis position is encapsulated most pointedly in the Crown’s repeated
statement in oral submissions that the Mìgmaq nation “lacked a Super Chief.”115
Te courts based this conclusion on the evidence of the Crown’s expert witness
who testifed that smaller collectives of Mìgmaq—rather than the Mìgmaq nation
as a whole—signed the seventeenth-century Peace and Friendship Treaties.116 Te
Court of Appeal of New Brunswick acknowledged the common cultural and
social bonds among the Mìgmaq nation as a whole, as well as the fact that the
smaller sub-entities historically came together to form a Grand Council.117 Tis
Grand Council, though, lacked a “grand chief,” and thus the Crown’s expert
concluded that it was “a cultural entity, not one of polity.”118 Te separate hunting
territories of each of the sub-entities also infuenced the courts’ conclusion.119
Finally, the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick relied on a passage in Van der Peet
where the Court repeatedly used the terms “groups” and “communities” to refer
to the rights-holders, as well as to a passage in Delgamuukw where the SCC
described Aboriginal rights as “communal.”120
Taking the last premise frst, Metallic highlights the circularity of concluding
that only the smaller communities—and not the larger community—can be the
rights-holder merely because Aboriginal rights are “communal.”121 Moreover,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ibid at para 60.
Metallic, supra note 13 at 234. See also Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 56-57.
Metallic, supra note 13 at 235.
Ibid. See also Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 53, 57.
Ibid at paras 56-57.
Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 57, citing R v Bernard, 2010 NBPC 30 at 124 [emphasis
added] [Bernard PC]. See also ibid at para 120.
119. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at paras 56-57.
120. Metallic, supra note 13 at 257-59, citing Bernard CA at paras 47, 52.
121. Metallic, supra note 13 at 258.
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the analysis in Part II(C-D), above, provides a full answer to the SCC’s use
of the terms “groups” and “communities” in Van der Peet. Given the Court’s
lack of textual analysis of section 35 as required by principles of constitutional
interpretation, and given the Court’s lack of justifcation for ignoring the term
“peoples” in section 35 and adopting the terms “groups” and “communities”
instead, the Court’s use of those terms cannot be considered part of the ratio in
Van der Peet, and thus is not determinative of rights-holders’ identities.
Moreover, the courts in Bernard succumbed to constitutional capture by
using positivism as the criteria by which to identify the rights-holder. Te courts
assumed an overarching decision-making authority or Super Chief must exist at
the level of the rights-holder but cite no authority in support of this positivist
requirement.122 Tis approach was explicitly rejected by the two lower courts in
Tsilhqot’in Nation, and that rejection was implicitly afrmed by the SCC when
it accepted that Aboriginal title is held by the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole.123
In contrast, if we consider the Mìgmaq Nation through the lens of its own
constitutionalism, we can avoid constitutional capture. Metallic explains that
Mìgmaq governance operates through a multi-level, federal structure; district
chiefs come together at the level of the Mìgmawei Grand Council (Mawiomi),
which is a political body.124 Te existence of separate hunting territories within
other levels of this federal structure in no way detracts from the political nature
of the Mawiomi. Te salient facts are that governance occurs at the level
of the Mìgmaq Nation through the Mawiomi, and that the Mìgmaq Nation
understands itself to be the rights-holder. Simply because the local levels within
the Mìgmaq Nation’s federal structure more closely resemble the conventions
of legal positivism or western exercises of jurisdiction, they cannot trump the
Mawiomi as the representative of the rights-holder. If they did, we would have a
prime example of constitutional capture.
What we need is a means of identifying the rights-holder that does not
succumb to constitutional capture, including capture by liberalism or positivism.
At frst glance, the solution might appear to be to impose a requirement that
the rights-holder must have a political structure which conforms to Indigenous
constitutionalism. But Indigenous peoples are not a homogenous monolith.

122. Te Court of Appeal relied on a statement from R v Marshall; R v Bernard about the
exclusive occupation requirement within the test for Aboriginal title. See R v Marshall;
R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 62 [Marshall; Bernard]; Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para
50. Metallic rightly explains that in so doing, the Court of Appeal unjustifably confates the
Aboriginal title test with the Aboriginal rights test. See Metallic, supra note 13 at 258.
123. See text accompanying notes 55 to 59.
124. Metallic, supra note 13 at 234, 253-55.
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No one form of political structure will resonate within the constitutionalism of
each Indigenous people.
Te logical conclusion is to use each Indigenous people’s own standard for
identifying their rights-holder. Tis means not formulating an a priori standard
of what constitutes a rights-holder and then measuring Indigenous peoples
against it. Rather, it means deferring to each particular Aboriginal people about
who their rights-holder is. In this way, we can identify a political entity without
succumbing to constitutional capture, including pan-Indigenous constitutional
capture. Tis approach is already well-supported by the jurisprudence. Te Court
of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation afrmed the trial judge’s conclusion that “the
defnition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined primarily from
the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself.”125 I noted above that the Powley
factors might be characterized as cultural markers.126 But we can now see that
assumption itself is captured by positivism. A more accurate statement is that
while the Powley factors do not require a positivist governmental structure, they
direct courts to identify the political entity which constitutes the rights-holder
according to the Indigenous people’s own laws. Te Powley factors include
shared customs, traditions, and collective identity. In other words, courts should
look to a people’s laws (shared customs, traditions) in whatever form they take,
including customary law, to determine who the rights-holder is according to
their law (their collective identity). Te value of the Powley factors is they avoid
constitutional capture.
Tis principle—that the identity of the rights-holder is to be decided by
an Aboriginal people themselves—is a common theme throughout the articles
in this special issue.127 It is also consistent with the right of self-determination,
which as Christie notes is a right of peoples at international law,128 and which is
afrmed by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.129
Article 33 in particular afrms not only Indigenous peoples’ right to determine
their own membership but also the right to determine their own identity.130 Shin
125. Tsilhqot’in Nation CA, supra note 60 at para 149; Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at para 59.
126. See text accompanying note 59.
127. Metallic, supra note 13 at 236-37, 18; McNeil, supra note 16 at 128, 32; Christie,
supra note 9 at 6.
128. Christie, supra note 9 at 26.
129. UN Declaration, supra note 96, arts 1, 3.
130. Ibid, art 33. Article 33 of the UN Declaration states:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in
accordance with their customs and traditions. Tis does not impair the right of indigenous
individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the membership
of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures (ibid).
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Imai and Kathryn Gunn explain this “right to determine identity makes it clear
that Indigenous people decide what to call themselves and how they identify the
constituent groupings that make up the people as a whole.”131
To summarize, the reasoning in the Bernard decisions is circular, ignores the
plain meaning of the text of section 35, and succumbs to constitutional capture.
In contrast, the approach adopted by the lower courts in Tsilhqot’in Nation, and
apparently approved by the SCC—including application of the Powley factors—
provides a roadmap for avoiding constitutional capture.
B. MUST A SECTION 35 RIGHTS-HOLDER SATISFY A COMMUNITYOCCUPATION-CONTINUITY REQUIREMENT?

Tis section examines the courts’ second reason for rejecting Mr. Bernard’s
section 35 claim. As Metallic explains, the trial judge introduced a new
community-occupation-continuity requirement, according to which the
contemporary rights-holding Aboriginal people must maintain a presence in the
area where the right was historically exercised.132 Te Court of Appeal of New
Brunswick in Bernard seems to afrm this requirement when it emphasizes the
trial judge’s fnding that prior to contact, a Mìgmaq “community” hunted in the
area where Mr. Bernard hunted, but this “community” left the area some time
ago and there was no evidence of a contemporary Mìgmaq “community” in the
area.133 Resolving this issue is important because British Columbia is raising it in
Desautel, which will be heard by the SCC.134 British Columbia relies on the Court
of Appeal of New Brunswick’s decision in Bernard, arguing that Mr. Desautel
cannot establish an Aboriginal right to hunt in British Columbia because the
Lakes Tribe of the Colville Confederated Tribes—of which Mr. Desautel is a
member—is now located not in British Columbia but in Washington state.135

131. Imai & Gunn, “Indigenous Belonging,” supra note 94 at 231.
132. Bernard PC, supra note 118 at paras 109, 127, 137; Metallic, supra note 13 at 234. Metallic
uses the term “community-continuity requirement” or “CCR” to refer to the Crown’s
proposed requirement. I use the term “community-occupation-continuity requirement” to
highlight how it difers from the community continuity requirement discussed in Powley,
but Metallic and I are both referring to the same thing, namely, the Crown’s proposed
requirement, which is much thicker than the actual doctrinal law established in Van der Peet
and Powley, as discussed in this section.
133. Bernard CA, supra note 73 at para 60. See also Bernard PC, supra note 118 at paras 101,
126. I place the term “community” in quotation marks to indicate that although the Court
of Appeal uses this term, it is not the correct term in this context given that “peoples”—the
term employed within section 35—is not synonymous with “communities.”
134. Desautel Leave to SCC Granted, supra note 28.
135. See Desautel CA, supra note 28 at paras 40, 58; R v Desautel, SCC File No 38734, 29 January
2020 (Factum of the Appellant, Her Majesty the Queen at para 62).
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Metallic’s thorough critique of the courts’ analysis in Bernard resonates with
many of the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s conclusions in Desautel. For
example, Metallic shows that a community-occupation-continuity requirement
assumes the Mìgmaq lived in static, fxed, sedentary village sites; thus, the
requirement ignores the reality of Mìgmaq social organization, including
sub-entities which were traditionally mobile and fssionable.136 Similarly, the Court
of Appeal in Desautel held that a community-occupation-continuity requirement
ignores the Aboriginal perspective, contrary to the SCC’s jurisprudence.137
Moreover, both Metallic and the Court of Appeal in Desautel explain that a
community-occupation-continuity requirement is not part of the current law.138
It is not a component of the Van der Peet test for identifying Aboriginal rights,139
nor is it introduced by the Powley decision.140 Te community continuity
requirement explained in Powley is much thinner than the Crown’s proposed
community-occupation-continuity requirement. Powley only requires that the
rights-holder continue to exist; it does not require that the rights-holder live or
otherwise have some presence where the rights-holder historically lived or where
the right is exercised.141 Te thin requirement follows tautologically from the
principle that the collective is the rights-holder.142 Since the rights-holder is the
collective, the collective who holds the right must currently exist. Te issue was
raised in Powley only because the existence of a contemporary Métis rights-holder
was contested. Te Court described the contemporary Métis rights-holder as
having gone “underground” for a period of time and acknowledged their “lack
of visibility,” but afrmed their continued existence.143 As Metallic explains, the
issue has not arisen and should not arise for First Nations—such as the Mìgmaq
Nation—who have not gone “underground” and who obviously continue
to exist.144 When the SCC in Powley discusses the continued existence of the
Métis rights-holder, it describes the Métis as being located “in and around Sault
Ste. Marie.”145 Nowhere in Powley does the Court make the location of the
rights-holder a requirement within the Aboriginal rights test. Te area in and
136.
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Metallic, supra note 13 at 245.
Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 62; Van der Peet, supra note 22 at paras 49-50.
Metallic, supra note 13 at 248; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 61.
Ibid.
Ibid at paras 58-59.
Powley, supra note 55 at paras 24-28; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 61.
See text accompanying note 4.
Powley, supra note 55 at para 27.
Metallic, supra note 13 at 251.
Powley, supra note 55 at paras 24, 25, 28.
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around Sault Ste. Marie just happened to be where Steve and Rod Powley lived
and so their location is described as such. In fact, as Jason Madden explains, the
Métis rights-holder in Powley is explicitly not defned as being limited to the area
“in and around Sault Ste. Marie.”146 Rather, the trial judge rejected the Crown’s
attempt to impose such a narrow defnition.147 Instead, the trial judge held the
geographical scope of the Métis rights-holder “extended hundreds of kilometres
to the east, north and west of Sault Ste. Marie, spanning almost 20,000 square
kilometres on the Canadian side” and going into northern Michigan.148 Te SCC
upheld these fndings.149
Metallic further critiques the community-occupation-continuity requirement
on the ground that it confates the Aboriginal rights test with the Aboriginal title
test,150 which does require the rights-holder to establish continuity of occupation,
at least in certain circumstances.151 Tis latter qualifcation should be emphasized:
Even within the Aboriginal title test, proving continuity of occupation is not a
standalone requirement. As explained in Delgamuukw and afrmed in Tsilhqot’in
Nation, continuity of occupation must be proved only when present occupation
is relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation.152 As long as the Aboriginal
claimant has direct evidence of their pre-sovereignty occupation and does not
rely on present occupation, there is no need to prove continuity.153 Imposing
continuity of occupation as a standalone requirement could result in the implicit
extinguishment of Aboriginal title, due to either abandonment or executive acts
dispossessing Aboriginal peoples of their land.154 But as Kent McNeil explains,
such implicit extinguishment is contrary to principles of both the common law
and section 35.155 As discussed, Aboriginal rights, including title, are collective
or communal rights, “and it appears that communal rights cannot be waived
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Madden, supra note 20 at 206.
Ibid.
Ibid, citing R v Powley, [1998] OJ No 5310 (Ont Ct J) at paras 68, 70.
Ibid, citing Powley, supra note 55 at paras 21, 26, 28.
Metallic, supra note 13 at 248.
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at paras 45-46 [Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC].
Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 152; Tsilhqot’in Nation SCC at paras 45-46.
See Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights” in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing
Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Purich Publishing Ltd, 2004) 127 at 135-36,
138 [McNeil, “Continuity”]; Karen Drake & Adam Gaudry, “‘Te lands … belonged to
them, once by the Indian title, twice for having defended them … and thrice for having built
and lived on them’: Te Law and Politics of Métis Title” (2016) 54 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 30
[Drake & Gaudry, “Métis Title”]. See also Delgamuukw, supra note 4 at para 152.
154. Drake & Gaudry, “Métis Title,” supra note 153 at 30.
155. McNeil, “Continuity,” supra note 153 at 137-38.
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or abandoned, particularly where the interests of future generations would be
jeopardized.”156 Moreover, as a legal right, Aboriginal title cannot be extinguished
by mere executive acts; Aboriginal title can only be extinguished by competent
legislation prior to 17 April 1982.157 As noted by both Metallic and the Court
of Appeal in Desautel, a community-occupation-continuity requirement within
the Aboriginal rights test would also allow for implicit extinguishment,158 which
would be just as contrary to the legal principles just discussed.
To summarize, the community-occupation-continuity requirement is not
grounded in the Aboriginal rights jurisprudence and thus should not be adopted
in subsequent decisions.

IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES IN APPLYING INDIGENOUS
LAW TO IDENTIFY THE RIGHTS-HOLDER
Tis section discusses some potential challenges of using an Indigenous people’s
laws to identify the rights-holder. A lack of consensus within an Indigenous people
about the content of their law might pose one such challenge. We should not
unnecessarily amplify this challenge for the reasons discussed in Part I. Canadian
society lacks consensus on all manner of legal and political topics, including the
issue of which level of government has jurisdiction in any given situation. Yet
Canadian society continues to function without a foreign nation articulating
and imposing on it a foreign standard for identifying our jurisdiction-holders.
Tus, we can look to an Indigenous people’s own legal and political systems
for resolving such disagreements. Sara Mainville undertakes this important
work with respect to the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters—now
also known as the Anishinaabe Nation of Treaty Tree—in her contribution
to this special issue.159 Te cases she discusses involve not internal but rather
external challenges—by the federal government and industry proponents—to
the identity of the rights-holder. Mainville highlights the signifcance of an
Indigenous people’s legal and political processes for developing consensus about
how to respond to such external challenges. Tis points toward a second potential
challenge, given Canadian governments’ attempts to undermine Indigenous legal
156. Ibid at 138.
157. Calder, supra note 69 at 316, Hall J; Sparrow, supra note 4 at 1098-1099 (citing,
with approval, Hall J’s analysis of extinguishment in Calder); Van der Peet, supra
note 22 at para 28.
158. Metallic, supra note 13 at 250; Desautel CA, supra note 28 at para 62.
159. Mainville, supra note 14 at 98.
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and political processes discussed above.160 Te third challenge discussed in this
section involves courts’ lack of deference to Indigenous law.
Our focus thus far has been on non-treaty section 35(1) rights, namely,
Aboriginal rights and title. Te process for identifying a treaty rights-holder
is somewhat diferent than that for identifying a non-treaty rights-holder. Put
simply, the treaty rights-holder is the party to the treaty. We can ask: Who
entered into the treaty with the Crown? As McNeil explains, the documents and
records of the treaty provide evidence in answering this question.161 Tat said,
just as disputes arise regarding the interpretation of substantive treaty provisions,
disputes can arise regarding the interpretation of treaty evidence about the proper
rights-holder. For example, who exactly is represented by the signatories to the
treaty? In such a situation, the approach used in the non-treaty context—namely,
applying an Indigenous people’s own laws to identify the rights-holder—can
provide guidance.
Mainville discusses the function of a Grand Council, which is a spiritual,
legal, and political institution that provides processes for achieving consensus
within an Anishinaabe nation.162 A Grand Council negotiated Treaty Tree on
behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.163 Mainville explains
Treaty Tree is a nation-to-nation treaty.164 Te Queen’s treaty commissioners
insisted on dealing with the Anishinaabeg as a nation in the Treaty Tree
negotiations.165 Tus, the treaty rights-holder is the Anishinaabe Nation of the
Boundary Waters, not the many bands imposed on the Nation by the Indian
Act. Later, colonial mechanisms—including various Indian Act provisions—
were used to weaken the Grand Council, which was eventually forced to meet
secretly.166 Grand Council Treaty Tree is the successor to the Grand Council
who negotiated Treaty Tree.167
In her article, Mainville draws on knowledge gained through her role as
past advisor to Grand Council Treaty Tree, through her study of Treaty Tree
during law school and graduate studies, and through conversations with Treaty
Tree knowledge holders.168 She explains miinigoziiwin, which is one aspect of
160.
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Anishinaabe inakonigaawin (Anishinaabe law) and which refers to the inherent
authority of the Anishinaabeg given by the Creator.169 A key concept related to
miinigoziiwin is that decision-making should be open to all and not done in secret,
so that the Nation can be “of one mind” in its decisions.170 Mainville explains two
protocols recently adopted by the Grand Council to uphold miinigoziiwin prior
to initiating litigation regarding Treaty Tree.171
Te frst protocol requires that a community seeking to initiate litigation to
uphold its Treaty Tree rights must obtain approval by the Grand Council.172
Te second protocol ensures the transparency of Grand Council decisions.173
It provides that during the frst two days of the spring and fall Assemblies,
“the Nation would convene as a National Assembly.” On the third and fnal
day, the Chiefs in Assembly would meet “to make decisions to implement the
Nation’s will.”174 Te frst two days of the Assemblies give all members of the
Nation an opportunity to participate and have a voice in the Grand Council’s
decision-making. Implementing participatory democracy in this way is a means
of upholding the Anishinaabe inakonigaawin principle about open decision
making. We can contrast this approach with the band council governance model
based on representative democracy.175 Tese two protocols together support the
goal of ensuring the nation is “of one mind” about Treaty Tree litigation.176
Te Grand Council complied with these two processes in approving the
“treaty right to education” case.177 Te Grand Council argued Treaty Tree
protects a right to education which the Crown breached, for example, by failing
to provide adequate resources to support quality education and by failing to
deliver culturally relevant education.178 Te Grand Council sought to bring a
representative action and to have the Grand Chief of the Grand Council made
the representative plaintif on behalf of the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary
Waters.179 Te Crown disagreed, arguing the proper rights-holder was not the
Nation as a whole but rather the twenty-eight individual Indian Act bands which
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Ibid at 121-22.
Ibid at 105, 122.
Ibid at 102.
Ibid at 111-12.
Ibid at 113.
Ibid.
See ibid at 112-13.
Ibid at 114.
Ibid at 177.
See ibid at 14; Kelly 2013, supra note 45 at paras 32-35.
Ibid at paras 4, 29.

DRAKE, INTRODUCTION TO OHLJ’S SPECIAL ISSUE xxxi

have been imposed over the Anishinaabe Nation of the Boundary Waters.180
Te Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s solution, which was
to attempt to go between the horns of the dilemma by allowing the Grand
Chief to serve as the representative plaintif of the nation, but only if each of the
twenty-eight bands passed band council resolutions authorizing the Grand Chief
to do so.181 Any bands who refused would have to be joined as party defendants
by the Grand Chief.182 Te courts characterized this decision—which has come
to be known as a “Kelly order”—as a practical solution to the dilemma of how
to identify the rights-holder on an interlocutory motion when resolution of the
issue requires a trial of the treaty claim.183 A Kelly order is meant to ensure all
putative rights-holders—both the Indigenous nation and the Indian Act bands—
are parties to the action, avoiding the need to decide between them.184 It should
be noted, though, that none of the twenty-eight bands claimed to be the proper
rights-holder; the issue was manufactured by the federal government. Moreover,
as Mainville explains, a Kelly order is not a mere minor logistical speedbump.
In the end, the Grand Council was unable to secure the twenty-eight band council
resolutions.185 Mainville identifes some potential reasons, none of which refect
an internal dispute about the identity of the proper rights-holder.186 Although it
was open to the Grand Council to continue the action by suing the bands who
did not pass resolutions, Mainville explains the problem with this approach in
the context of a second piece of litigation approved by the Grand Council where
this same issue arose.
In the second case, the Grand Council sought judicial review of Ontario’s
decision to allow the sale of hydro dams.187 Two intervenors in the case sought a
Kelly order, which would force the Grand Council to sue any of its twenty-eight
bands who failed to pass the requisite band council resolution.188 As Mainville
explains, the Grand Council argued Kelly orders are ofensive as they contravene
Anishinaabe custom, or in other words, laws.189 Being required to sue a segment of
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one’s own citizens—forcing them into an adversarial process—is hardly conducive
to generating consensus, upholding miinigoziiwin, and working toward being of
“one mind.” Recognizing this, the court acknowledged the perception that Kelly
orders “could be used as a divide-and-conquer tactic in civil litigation against
Aboriginal peoples.”190 Despite this acknowledgement, the court granted the
intervenors’ motion for a Kelly order.191 Two of the court’s reasons relate to the
themes of this special issue.
First, according to the court, the Grand Council’s argument that the
Anishinaabe Nation is the rights-holder pursuant to Anishinaabe custom or
law is “no more than a self-serving assertion of something that the court may
ultimately have to determine.”192 Te court also stated the Grand Council and its
representative, the Grand Chief, “are not correct simply because they say so.”193
Here we encounter the third potential challenge to applying Indigenous law in
identifying the rights-holders: a court’s refusal to defer to Indigenous law. Tis
court’s lack of deference to the Anishinaabe Nation’s law about its own collective
identity runs counter to the jurisprudence discussed above, which establishes that
“the defnition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be determined primarily
from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective itself.”194 In other words, the
rights-holder is whoever the Indigenous people’s law says is the rights-holder.
An Indigenous people might not be correct simply because they say so, but
they are correct because their law says so. We also saw above that deference to
Indigenous law is required to avoid constitutional capture. As such, it is not
clear why the court expects to play such a signifcant role in adjudicating this
issue. Granted, as discussed above, the identity of a treaty rights-holder will
depend on the historical evidence of who entered into the treaty.195 But evidence
only has meaning within a normative framework, or in other words, within a
constitutional order. And avoiding constitutional capture means interpreting
evidence through the lens of an Indigenous people’s own constitutionalism.
In reserving a signifcant role for itself, is the court here planning to engage in
constitutional capture, assuming it will select an a priori standard and assess
whether the Indigenous people’s political structure meets that standard? Or is the
court assuming its expertise regarding Anishinaabe inakonigaawin exceeds that of
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the Anishinaabe Nation, such that the court is prepared to claim the Anishinaabe
Nation’s understanding of its own law is incorrect?196 Both options are untenable.
Te court’s labelling of the Grand Council’s argument as “self-serving” is puzzling
given the Grand Council’s argument refects current jurisprudence as well as the
logical outcome of avoiding constitutional capture.
Let’s consider the court’s second reason for granting the intervenors’ motion
for a Kelly order. Te court held the Anishinaabe Nation’s argument that it is the
rights-holder “has a Shakespearean ‘the lady doth protest too much’ aura to it.”197
Te motion judge wrote:198
I do not understand why the Applicants would object to having the 28 Indian
Bands joined as parties to the Application. If it is true that in accordance with
Aboriginal customary law that the [Anishinaabe Nation is] the rights holder, then
the Indian Bands will stand down and not defend the Application but be bound by
the outcome.

Tis reasoning is oblivious to the constitutional capture of Indian Act bands whose
authority is statutory and who are bound by Canadian law, which often conficts
with Anishinaabe inakonigaawin. For example, the chief and council of an Indian
Act band owe fduciary duties to the members of their band,199 and not to the
nation as a whole. Tese fduciary duties include a duty to manage the band’s
assets in the best interests of the band’s members.200 In most contexts, one hopes
a compelling argument could be formulated that using a band’s assets to protect
the Indigenous people’s Aboriginal and treaty rights is in the best interest of the
band’s membership. Tat said, it is not difcult to imagine a band—struggling
to provide basic public services and necessities to its members—who deems a test
case too precarious under the Canadian legal system to risk its severely limited
band assets on a possible costs award against it.
Mainville’s paper is especially valuable because it highlights the adversarial
nature of Canadian procedural law and the “divide and conquer strategy” used
196. For a discussion of courts’ reluctance to defer to Indigenous law, especially as compared to
courts’ willingness to defer to foreign law, see Karen Drake, “Indigenous Oral Traditions in
Court: Hearsay or Foreign Law?” in Drake & Gunn, supra note 23, 281 at 302-304.
197. Kelly 2014, supra note 183 at para 36.
198. Ibid at para 37.
199. Jack Woodward, Native Law (Tomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2019) (loose-leaf revision
2020, release 3), ch 7 at para 740, citing Williams Lake Indian Band v Abbey, [1992] 4
CNLR 21 (BCSC) at para 14.
200. Ibid, ch 7 at para 741, citing Louie v Louie, 2015 BCCA 247; Basil v Lower Nicola Indian
Band, 2009 FC 741 at para 95; Moon v Campbell River Indian Band, [1997] 1 CNLR 77
(Fed TD), afrmed (1999), 176 DLR (4th) 254 (Fed CA).
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by the Crown and proponents.201 Tis adversarial approach is in stark contrast
to the goal of reconciliation, which at the very least denotes a non-adversarial
relationship.202 More importantly, the Crown’s adversarial approach conficts
with Anishinaabe inakonigaawin. As Mainville explains, “Treaties are about
relationships” and “they are not meant to create winners and losers.”203 But the
Treaty Tree litigation discussed by Mainville “has created even deeper relations
of animosity with the Crown.”204

V. WHO SHOULD DECIDE THE IDENTITY OF THE RIGHTSHOLDER?
A fnal theme of this special issue asks: Who should decide the identity of the
rights-holder? Te discussion thus far demonstrates the perils of leaving this
issue to the courts. Christie’s analysis reveals how the SCC’s jurisprudence is
captured by liberalism, which results in rights-holders being characterized as
mere socio-cultural units instead of political entities. Tis outcome contradicts
the plain language of section 35, which explicitly identifes rights-holders as
“peoples,” a term that denotes political entities. Similarly, Metallic’s analysis
reveals how the courts’ reasoning in R v Bernard is captured by positivism. And
Mainville argues Treaty Tree is a nation-to-nation treaty that can be altered only
through the negotiated agreement of the parties,205 and not by courts imposing
their captured understandings onto the treaty and the parties.
In his contribution to this special issue, Paul Chartrand argues that the
identity of a rights-holder is the prerogative of the executive as opposed to the
judiciary.206 Like Christie, he is concerned with the trend toward judicialization
of Aboriginal rights provoked by section 35.207 Chartrand is not defending a
unilateral power of the executive to dictate the identity of rights-holders. Rather,
he argues constitutional legitimacy depends on consent, and thus the identity
of rights-holders should be decided through political negotiations between
political actors, as in the case of historical and modern treaties.208 Chartrand
highlights the Métis Nation Accord—a component of the 1992 Charlottetown
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Accord—which was the result of political negotiations and which included a
defnition of the Métis Nation. Although the Charlottetown Accord was defeated
in a referendum, it had the consent of the federal government, all provincial
governments, and the Métis Nation. More recently, the Métis Nation of Alberta,
the Métis Nation-Saskatchewan, and the Métis Nation of Ontario each entered
into a Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement with
Canada. Pursuant to these agreements, Canada recognizes that each of the
Métis government signatories is mandated to represent the Métis collectivity
comprising its citizens.209
Te federal government’s Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous
Rights Framework also envisions a role for the executive in identifying
rights-holders. Itproposes that the Minister of Crown–Indigenous Relations, on the
advice of an advisory committee or institution, would make recommendations to
the Governor in Council regarding the recognition of Indigenous rights-holders;
the Governor in Council would then add the rights-holders to a schedule of
legislation to be developed pursuant to the Framework.210
Chartrand’s argument is also infuenced by courts’ deference to state
practice. Te executive recognizes foreign states by entering into ofcial relations
with them, and courts defer to this recognition.211 Analogizing from states’
recognition of each other, some argue Indigenous peoples’ recognition of other
Indigenous peoples is an essential element of the identifcation of Indigenous
peoples.212 Tis approach has the beneft of ensuring Indigenous peoples are not
dependent on the state for their recognition. It could also forestall the problem
of non-Indigenous individuals forming organizations and falsely claiming to be
an Indigenous people.213 A recent example of recognition of Indigenous peoples
by other Indigenous peoples is provided by the Joint Declaration executed on 16
January 2020 by the Métis Nation of Alberta, the Métis Nation-Saskatchewan,
209. See e.g. Métis Government Recognition and Self-Government Agreement between Métis Nation of
Ontario and Canada, 17 June 2019, ss 2.02, 3.01, 1.01, online (pdf ): Métis Nation of Ontario
<www.metisnation.org/media/655331/2019-06-27-metis-government-recognition-and-selfgovernment-agreement.pdf> [perma.cc/M24V-PQND].
210. “Overview of a Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights Framework” (last
modifed 10 September 2018), online: Government of Canada <www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/
eng/1536350959665/1539959903708> [perma.cc/H884-Q6LH].
211. Chartrand, supra note 206 at 182.
212. Joshua Castellino & Cathal Doyle, “Who Are ‘Indigenous Peoples’? An Examination of
Concepts Concerning Group Membership in the UNDRIP” in Hohmann & Weller, supra
note 94, 7 at 19.
213. See Darryl Leroux, Distorted Descent: White Claims to Indigenous Identity (University of
Manitoba Press, 2019).
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and the Métis Nation of Ontario.214 Each signatory of the Joint Declaration
recognizes that the three Métis governments are “the only Métis-created and
legitimate representative governments of rights-bearing Métis citizens in Alberta,
Saskatchewan and Ontario.”215
Jason Madden’s contribution to this special issue also highlights the
signifcance of negotiations in identifying the rights-holder. As Madden explains,
in Powley, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Ontario’s argument that it was
justifed in denying Métis rights because identifying Métis rights-holders was
too difcult.216 In so doing, the Court slayed a dragon of Métis rights-denial,
as Madden puts it.217 And yet, this dragon has reared its head again in Fort
Chipewyan Métis Nation of Alberta Local #125 v Alberta.218 Madden argues
that the SCC’s conclusion in Powley entails a duty on Crown governments to
negotiate with an Indigenous people to identify the proper rights-holder when
a prima facie Aboriginal right exists.219 Te alternative is the illogical result from
Fort Chipewyan, where a prima facie Aboriginal right exists, and yet there is no
rights-holder, rendering the right hollow.220

VI. CONCLUSION
Te papers in this collection demonstrate the need for compulsory Indigenous and
Aboriginal law content within law school curricula. With respect to Aboriginal
law, Metallic’s analysis reveals a wide discrepancy between well-established
SCC jurisprudence and the lower courts’ reasoning in R v Bernard. As Metallic
notes, “One possible reason is that the Aboriginal rights test—including how
it interacts with the treaty rights, Aboriginal title, and Métis rights tests—is
overly complex and confusing, especially for judges who likely did not study
this area in law school or practice in this area.”221 Similarly, as Christie’s article
demonstrates, despite the Court’s commitment to giving equal weight to the
214. Joint Declaration: Métis Nation of Alberta Provincial Council, Métis Nation-Saskatchewan
Provincial Métis Council, Provisional Council of the Métis Nation of Ontario, 16 January
2020, online (pdf ): Métis Nation of Ontario <www.metisnation.org/media/655544/
joint-declaration-mna-mns-mno.pdf> [perma.cc/22NA-9LS5] [Joint Declaration].
215. Ibid at 1 [emphasis in original].
216. Madden, supra note 20 at 200.
217. Ibid.
218. 2016 ABQB 713 [Fort Chipewyan].
219. Madden, supra note 20 at 226-27.
220. Ibid at 201.
221. Metallic, supra note 13 at 261.
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“Aboriginal perspective,”222 its section 35 jurisprudence is captured by liberalism
insofar as it characterizes rights-holders as mere social-cultural entities instead of
political entities. Turning to Indigenous law, McNeil explains that Indigenous
peoples’ own law determines the identity of the rights-holder. And yet, as McNeil
recognizes, “Canadian judges are generally unfamiliar with Indigenous law and
cannot access it through conventional legal research.”223 And Mainville’s article
illustrates how the “divide and conquer” approach adopted by the Crown and
proponents, and upheld by the Court, generated not reconciliation but deep
animosity within a treaty relationship. Mainville advocates for treaty councils
as a form of dispute resolution; these Indigenous law institutions would help
balance the relationship between Indigenous peoples and Crown governments.224
Although Adrien Habermacher’s article was not part of the workshop that
generated this special issue, it makes a valuable contribution to the ongoing
discussion about indigenizing Canadian law schools. It provides empirical data
on the attitudes of individual faculty members at three Canadian law schools
on three topics: (1) Territory acknowledgements; (2) Indigenous content in law
school curricula including mandatory courses; and (3) Recruitment of Indigenous
faculty members and students.225 Ascertaining the rationales underlying obstinacy
toward these topics, especially the latter two, is key to addressing that obstinacy.
As Senator Murray Sinclair, former Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, has said on many occasions, “education got us into this mess and
education will get us out of it.”226
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